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Polarized Circuits: Party Affiliation of Appointing
Presidents, Ideology, and Circuit Court Voting in
Race and Gender Civil Rights Cases
Christopher Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
Empty federal judicial benches,' long Senate confirmation delays,2
highly partisan Senate judiciary confirmation hearings, 3 and Kabuki
theater4 characterize the polarizing environment that is the federal judiciary
branch. Such an atmosphere raises the question of whether the partisanship
and politicization within the confirmation process affects how appointed
federal judges cast their votes. Assuming the political ideology of federal
judges is measurable, does that ideology correlate to judicial decision
making in a liberal versus a conservative direction, in case outcomes that
can be categorized as either liberal or conservative?
It is important to examine judicial political ideology and how it
correlates with judicial decision making because Americans want to believe
that federal judges make their decisions based on the merits of the law as
* J.D. 2001, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A. 1998, University of Richmond.
Christopher Smith is a Law and Government LL.M. candidate at American University's
Washington College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Jeffrey Lubbers of
American University's Washington College of Law for his guidance and suggestions.
1. Judges and Judgeships, Judicial Vacancies, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndudgeships/JudicialVacancies.aspx (last visited Oct. 13,
2010) (demonstrating that approximately one out of every eight federal judgeships is
vacant).
2. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Op-Ed., A Crisis in Our Courts, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2010, at
A25 (noting that twenty-three judicial nominees, as of September 28, 2010, "are enduring
long delays while awaiting up-or-down [confirmation] votes").
3. Karl A. Schweitzer, Litigating the Appointments Clause: The Most Effective
Solution for Senate Obstruction of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
909, 909-10 (2010) ("[T]he increased partisanship and obstruction at the hands of both
Democrats and Republicans involved in the Senate confirmation process for federal judges
has been the subject of much scholarly discussion and criticism.").
4. David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics ofJudicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L.
REv. 1033, 1066 (2008) (citing Editorial, How Conservative is Judge Roberts?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2005, at A30) (quoting then-Senator Joe Biden, who described recent Supreme
Court confirmation hearings "as more of a 'Kabuki dance' than an opportunity to find out
substantive information about a nominee").
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applied to a given set of facts, and not based on partisan political ideology.'
It may be impossible to causally connect judicial decisions with political
ideology because it is impossible to know why a judge makes a particular
decision without questioning that judge's subjective reasoning. However,
it is possible to examine correlations between ideologically categorized
case outcomes and a measure of judicial ideology. At a minimum, such
examination should shed light on whether the ideal of an independent, non
partisan judiciary branch holds true.
The research and analysis on the role of political ideology in judicial
decision making is wide-ranging and extensive.6 However, this Article has
a narrow focus: the influence of judicial political ideology on judicial
voting patterns within the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals ("circuit
courts"), within the context of civil rights cases, particularly race and
gender cases. The Article focuses on circuit court judges instead of district
court judges because the latter conduct jury trials where it is difficult to
measure judicial ideology and its impact, given that the jury is usually the
ultimate arbiter of the case.' Moreover, district court cases are often
routine on matters of law, while circuit court cases are more difficult and
more likely to be contested on ideological grounds.
This Article also focuses on the circuit courts, as opposed to the
Supreme Court, because the circuit courts are where the bulk of federal
5. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2006) ("Many people believe that, as a general rule, political
ideology should not and does not affect legal judgments."); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality
and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1336-37 (1998)
(expressing a view that if people believe that judicial decision making is ideologically
driven, then they will be skeptical of the courts, view judges as lawless in their decision
making, and will lose trust in the court system).
6. Some of the studies of political ideology and judicial decision making include:
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1717 (1997); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 107 YALE
L.J. 2155 (1998); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein et
al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts ofAppeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA.
L. REV. 301 (2004); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999); Tracey E. George,
Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1635 (1998); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts ofAppeals, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1457 (2003); Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting
Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision-
making, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1150 (2004); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter:
Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759
(2005).
7. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
8. Id. at 4.
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case-law decisions are made.' The circuit courts are required to accept all
final decisions or orders on appeal from district courts,'o whereas the
Supreme Court hears only those cases for which it either accepts a certified
question of law from the circuit court or grants a writ of certiorari." In
2008, the Supreme Court granted review of only eighty-seven cases, yet
8966 cases were on the Supreme Court's docket. 12 Given the judicial "law
of the land" is overwhelmingly set at the circuit court level, it is very
important to examine correlations between circuit court judicial voting
patterns and judicial ideology, at least as important as at the Supreme Court
level.
This Article proceeds from the Introduction in four additional parts.
Part II outlines the two hypotheses regarding the judicial voting patterns
and behavior this Article examines. Part III discusses the empirical study
against which the two hypotheses are tested, and assesses and analyzes the
study and its findings in terms of the two hypotheses. Part IV of this
Article outlines some deficiencies in the methodology of the study against
which the two hypotheses are tested and proposes suggestions for future
studies. This Article concludes by discussing possible implications for the
Obama administration regarding the issues discussed herein.
II. THE IDEOLOGY GAP AND THE RACE/GENDER GAP
HYPOTHESES
To study ideology and judicial voting patterns, this Article explores the
data, analysis, and findings of a recent study by Cass R. Sunstein, David
Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman, and Andres Sawicki (collectively "Sunstein"),
which examined the effect of political ideology on circuit court judge
voting across various case categories. 13 The Sunstein study serves as the
source of this Article because it is a fairly recent study, focuses on circuit
court political ideology and decision making, separately examines circuit
court voting in race-based and gender-based civil rights cases, and presents
its statistics and findings clearly and a in manner that allows use of the data
to test the hypotheses outlined below.
Two hypotheses form the foundation for this Article. Focusing on civil
rights cases from the 1970s through the 2000s, the first hypothesis
9. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (noting that the Supreme Court rarely reviews
lower court decisions and oftentimes the decisions of the circuit courts are effectively final).
10. Bray v. United States, 370 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that an appeal from a
judgment of a district court is a matter of right).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2008); SUP. CT. R. 10 (stating that "review on a writ of certiorari is
not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion").
12. Supreme Court ofthe United States-Cases on Docket, Disposed of and Remaining
on Docket at Conclusion of December Terms, 2004 Through 2008, Tbl.A-1., UNITED
STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?
doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/appendices/AO 1 Sep09.pdf.
13. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 17-18.
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("Ideology Gap Hypothesis") posits that the ideological voting gap has
widened over time between circuit court judges appointed by Republican
Presidents (hereinafter "Republican judges") and circuit court judges
appointed by Democratic Presidents (hereinafter "Democratic judges") in
terms of the percentage likelihood that they will vote in a liberal direction
("liberal voting percentage"), meaning in favor of a race or gender civil
rights claim. In other words, for civil rights cases, the data should show
that the ideological voting gap between the earlier-appointed Democratic
judges and earlier-appointed Republican judges is narrower than the
ideological voting gap between more recently appointed Democratic judges
and more recently appointed Republican judges. Moreover, more recently
appointed Democratic judges should be voting in higher liberal voting
percentages than those appointed by earlier Democratic Presidents, while
more recently appointed Republican judges should be voting in lower
liberal voting percentages than those appointed by earlier Republican
Presidents.
The Sunstein data can only prove or disprove the existence of changes
in circuit court judicial voting patterns in civil rights using presidential
appointing party affiliation as a proxy for judicial ideology. Nevertheless,
it is worth noting the theory underlying this hypothesis, which is that the
Democratic and Republican parties have become more ideologically
extreme over the past forty or fifty years, and that this increased
partisanship extends to the federal judiciary as well.14 More precisely, this
Article theorizes that more recently appointed judges reflect the increased
partisanship within the two parties, and therefore should exhibit a higher
percentage of stereotypical ideological voting in civil rights cases than their
respective predecessors.
This theory operates under the following assumptions: (1) that circuit
court judges vote, at least in part, based on ideology; (2) that appointing
presidential party affiliation does in fact serve as a proxy for judicial
ideology; and (3) that appointing presidential party affiliation is a proxy for
a given conservative ideology (in the case of the Republican Party), or
liberal ideology (in the case of the Democratic Party). While some of these
assumptions may be large assumptions subject to critique, proving or
disproving the Ideology Gap Hypothesis at least provides some evidence to
support or reject the underlying theory. Should the hypothesis prove true,
the underlying theory is merely one among many possible explanations for
the observed judicial voting behavior. Future scholarly endeavors may
want to further explore or test the assumptions identified above and/or
alternative theories to the one posited herein.
14. William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L.
REv. 307, 308 (2008) (arguing that Congress has become increasingly politically polarized).
[Vol. 22:1160
The second hypothesis ("Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis") posits that
the Democratic judges and Republican judges will vote more similarly to
each other in gender civil rights cases than in racial civil rights cases. The
Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis is focused solely on the present gap between
Democratic and Republican judges in terms of voting on women's and
African American's civil rights issues rather than any changes to that gap
over time.
For the Ideology Gap Hypothesis, the Sunstein data will, at best,
demonstrate whether the hypothesized race/gender voting gap exists and
whether assigned judicial political ideology is predictive of differing voting
patterns between Democratic and Republican judges in racial civil rights
cases versus gender civil rights cases. Nonetheless, the underlying theory
is that Republican judges are more sensitive to gender civil rights issues
than racial civil rights issues and that Democratic judges are probably
equally sensitive to both issues, or maybe more sensitive to racial civil
rights issues than gender civil rights issues.
A number of assumptions inform the theory underlying the
Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis. First, this Article posits that women appear
to play a more prominent leadership role in the Republican Party than
African Americans, whereas both women and African Americans play
prominent roles in the Democratic Party. Although party leadership could
be measured in a number of ways, this Article looks at political party
leadership as evidenced by the President, Vice-President, political parties'
nominees for those offices, representation in Congress, and representation
as Governors. This Article looks to these factors as evidence of women's
leadership role compared to African Americans' leadership role within
each party. As of the writing of this Article, there are only two Republican
African-American congressmen," and no Republican African-American
Senators or Governors.16 By contrast, there are four female Republican
Senators, seventeen Republican Congresswomen in the 111th Congress,
and three female Republican Governors. Furthermore, former Alaskan
Governor Sarah Palin was the Republican nominee for Vice-President in
2008.17 On the Democratic side of the equation, there are two African-
15. Jennifer Steinhauer, Black and Republican and Back in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/11/06/us/politics/06house.html.
16. Governors of the American States, Commonwealths and Territories: 2010,
NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION (June 9, 2010), http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/BIO
BOOK; Jennifer E. Manning, Membership of the 111th Congress: A Profile,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 5 (July 19, 2010), http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/
crs-publish.cfm?pid=%260BL)PL%3B%3D%0A (identifying all African-American
Senators in the 111th Congress to be Democrats). Although he is not an elected official, this
Article would be remiss in not mentioning that Michael Steele, the Chairman of the
Republican National Committee, is African-American. See Leadership: Chairman Michael
Steele, GOP, http://www.gop.com/index.php/learn/leadership (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
17. Governors of the American States, supra note 16; Manning, supra note 16, at 5
(identifying four female Republican Senators and seventeen Republican Congresswomen in
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American Democratic Governors, forty-one African-American
congressmen, one African-American Senator, and President Obama, who is
of mixed African/Caucasian descent.18 There are three female Democratic
Governors, fifty-nine Democratic congresswomen, and thirteen female
Democratic Senators.19 The political offices outlined above suggest that
women have a much stronger leadership role within the Republican Party
than African-Americans, while both African Americans and women have
substantial leadership roles in the Democratic Party and are on a somewhat
equal footing.
This Article starts with the two assumptions that women play more of a
leadership role within the Republican Party than African Americans and
that women and African Americans play somewhat equal leadership roles
in the Democratic Party. This Article makes further assumptions as part of
the theory underlying the Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis: (1) that the
difference in gender and race leadership within the Republican Party is
evidence that the Republican Party is more sensitive to gender issues than
race issues, and the similar leadership roles for women and African
Americans in the Democratic Party is evidence that the Democratic Party is
equally sensitive to both gender and race issues; (2) that the President, as a
member and, arguably, the leader of his/her political party embodies those
same sensitivities as part of the party ideology; (3) that appointing
presidential party affiliation is a proxy for judicial ideology along those
same ideological lines; and (4) that circuit judges vote, at least in part,
based on that ideology.
In sum, the theory underlying the Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis is that
Republican judges reflect the ideological sensitivities of the Republican
Party on race and gender civil rights issues as embodied within the
appointing Republican President, and therefore Republican judges should
be more sensitive to gender civil rights issues than racial civil rights issues
and cast more liberal votes on the former over the latter. On the
Democratic side, the theory follows the same assumptions with the
hypothesis that Democratic judges should be equally sensitive to gender
civil rights and racial civil rights issues and should cast a somewhat equal
number of liberal votes in both sets of cases. In the end, the theory
underlying the Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis posits that the ideological
voting gap between Democratic and Republican judges should be smaller
with regard to gender civil rights cases than racial civil rights cases because
the 111th Congress); Leland Ware & David C. Wilson, Jim Crow on the 'Down Low':
Subtle Racial Appeals in Presidential Campaigns, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 299,
333-34 (2009) (identifying Sarah Palin as the Republican Party's first female vice-
presidential nominee).
18. Governors of the American States, supra note 16; Manning supra note 16, at 5
(identifying the African-American Democratic members of the 111th Congress).
19. Id.
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Republican judges are less sensitive to racial civil rights issues than gender
civil rights issues, while Democratic judges are equally sensitive to both.
As with the Ideology Gap Hypothesis, should the data support the
Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis, the theory stated herein to explain the
Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis is but one of a number of possible
explanations. Moreover, some of the assumptions may be subject to
critique. However, exploring the Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis provides at
least a starting point for whether or not the underlying theory is valid at all.
Future studies may want to explore in more depth the assumptions outlined
above as well as alternative theories to the one posited herein.
III. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES: USING THE SUNSTEIN
STUDY ON CIRCUIT COURT IDEOLOGICAL
VOTING TRENDS
Although there are a number of recent studies on circuit court
ideological voting in civil rights cases, none of the studies directly address
the two hypotheses raised by this Article.2 0 However, the most recent and
comprehensive study that touches on these issues is the Sunstein study.
Outlined below is a brief description of the Sunstein study, its methodology
and findings, and an assessment of the study in terms of the two hypotheses
raised in this Article.
A. DATA FROM THE SUNSTEIN STUDY ON CIRCUIT COURT JUDICIAL
VOTING PATTERNS IN RACE AND GENDER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
The Sunstein study examined the effect of political ideology on the
ideological direction of circuit court judges' votes in 6408 published three-
judge panel decisions including 19,224 judicial votes.2 1 Sunstein's study is
limited to published opinions.22 Sunstein examined various categories of
20. Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1319, 1327 (2009)
(examining ideological panel effects on judicial voting in Title VII sex discrimination cases
in the circuit courts); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior:
A Statistical Study 22 (Apr. 14, 2008), (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/supctLawPosner.pdf (examining ideological driven
votes in civil, criminal, constitutional, economic, and labor circuit court cases decided from
1925 through 2002); Michael J. Songer, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The Role of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MiCH. J. RACE & L. 247,
248, 254 (2005) (examining the role of circuit court judicial ideology on the outcomes of
disparate impact Title VII cases by African-American plaintiffs); Peresie, supra note 6, at
1761 (studying the effect of gender, in terms of panel effects, for Title VII sex
discrimination and sexual harassment cases); Charles M. Cameroon & Craig P. Cummings,
Diversity and Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Affirmative Action Cases in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 1971-1999 (Mar. 30, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) available
at http://www.yale.edu/coic/CameronCummings.pdf (examining the effect of race, gender,
and ideology on affirmative action cases in the circuit courts).
21. SUNSTEINETAL., supra note 5, at 17-18.
22. Id. at 18.
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cases, focusing on cases that Sunstein deemed to be most controversial and
most likely to reveal different voting patterns for Republican versus
Democratic judges.23 Of particular importance for this Article is Sunstein's
analysis of affirmative action, Title VII race discrimination, sex
24discrimination, and sexual harassment cases.
To obtain data, Sunstein conducted Lexis searches on each case type or
category of circuit court decision and filtered the resulting cases to limit the
data set to relevant cases; for example, those cases that actually resolve a
sex discrimination dispute and not those that only refer to sex
discrimination as a side issue or in dicta.25 For affirmative action cases,
Sunstein searched Lexis for "affirmative action and constitution and
constitutional," as well as cases citing United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) and Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).26 If a judge voted to hold any
part of an affirmative action plan unconstitutional, then Sunstein treated the
vote as a vote against the plan.27 The affirmative action case sample
included cases from June 28, 1978, through June 30, 2004,28 and the
sample size was 161 cases. 2 9 For Title VII cases, Sunstein searched Lexis
for "Title VII and African-American or black."30  Sunstein examined Title
VII cases from January 1, 1985, through June 30, 2004, and the total
sample size was 363 cases.3 1  For sex discrimination cases, Sunstein
searched Lexis for "sex! discrimination or sex! harassment."32 Sunstein
examined sex discrimination cases from January 1, 1995, through January
30, 2004, and the total sample size was 1081 cases. For sexual
harassment cases, treated as a subset of sex discrimination cases, Sunstein
searched Lexis for "sex! harassment." 34  Sunstein examined sexual
harassment cases from January 1, 1995, through June 30, 2004, and the
total sample size was 517 cases. For the Title VII, sex discrimination,
23. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 8, 17-18 (outlining all of the case types that
Sunstein examined and discussing the reasons for those choices).
24. Id. at 20-21, 31-32. Sunstein also examined desegregation cases as a category.
However, this paper does not examine the desegregation cases because the cases are
basically nonexistent in the last twenty years. See id. at 36-37.
25. Id. at 17, n.1.
26. Id. at 17, n.8.
27. Id.
28. For each category of case, Sunstein generally used a date range of judicial votes from
1995 to 2004 in order to keep the inquiry manageable. However, Sunstein occasionally
used a longer date range in order to produce a sufficient sample size of judicial votes for a
particular category. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 17, n.8.
30. Id. at 17, n.9.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 17, n.10.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 17, n.12.
35. Id.
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and sexual harassment cases, Sunstein treated any vote to afford the
plaintiff any sort of relief as a pro-plaintiff vote. 36 The raw data table is
illustrated below.
Table 1
Case Type Date Range Sample Size
Affirmative Action 1978-2004 161 cases
Title VII 1985-2004 363 cases
Sex Discrimination 1995-2004 1081 cases
Sexual Harassment 1995-2004 517 cases
To measure judicial ideology, Sunstein identified each judge as a
Democratic appointee or Republican appointee based on the party of that
judge's appointing President. Sunstein used the party of affiliation of the
appointing President as a proxy for the ideology of the appointed judge,
with the view that a judge appointed by a Democratic President would vote
in a more liberal direction and a judge appointed by a Republican President
would vote in a more conservative direction.3 8 Generally, Sunstein treated
a vote in favor of a discrimination plaintiff to be a liberal vote and a vote
upholding an affirmative action plan as a liberal vote.
It is important to emphasize, as Sunstein did, that the appointing
presidential party affiliation is only a proxy for judicial ideology with
recognized weaknesses. First, undoubtedly some Democratic Presidents
have appointed conservative judges and vice versa for Republican
Presidents.40 Second, Senators of the appointing President's party and the
judge's home state play a substantial role in the choice of judge through the
practice of "senatorial courtesy."4 1 Despite these weaknesses, measuring
judicial voting patterns according to the appointing President's party will
demonstrate whether Republican and Democratic Presidents select judges
with different views, the extent to which those views differ, and whether
Republican and Democratic judges cast systematically different votes from
each other in specific case categories.42
Sunstein's study explored three issues: (1) the impact of the appointing
President's party affiliation on the ideological direction of a judge's vote;
(2) whether a judge's tendency to vote along predicted ideological lines is
dampened when he or she sits on a panel with two judges of a different
political party affiliation than his or her own; and (3) whether a judge's
36. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 17, nn.9-10, n. 12.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 19.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 6.
42. See id. at 5.
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tendency to vote along predicted ideological lines is amplified when he or
she sits on a panel with two judges of the same political party affiliation as
his or her own.43 This discussion will focus primarily on the first issue.
1. Sunstein's Racial Civil Rights Cases Findings
Sunstein examined affirmative action cases from 1978 through 2004,
revealing that Democratic judges voted in favor of affirmative action plans
75% of the time, while Republican judges voted in favor of them 47% of
the time.4 Despite the large voting gap for affirmative action cases, the
voting gap was much smaller for Title VII race discrimination cases, where
Democratic judges voted in favor of the plaintiffs 43% of the time and
Republican judges voted in favor of the plaintiffs 34% of the time.4 5 The
46
voting gaps for both sets of data are statistically significant voting gaps.
These statistics are illustrated below.
Table 2
Democratic Republican
Case Type Judges' Liberal Judges' Liberal Votg
Vote Percentage Vote Percentage
Affirmative 75% 47% 28%
Action
Title VII 43% 34% 9%
Sunstein never discusses possible explanations for why the data
illustrates starkly different voting gaps between the two sets of judges, even
though affirmative action cases and Title VII race cases both involve race
and remedying racial discrimination. One plausible explanation for the two
different voting gaps may be that affirmative action is a more partisan issue
than Title VII race discrimination. In other words, many Republicans are
fundamentally opposed to the concept of affirmative action,47 whereas they
are not fundamentally opposed to Title VII, but merely favor a narrower
interpretation of Title VII, or believe that Title VII is overly enforced.4 8 If
Republican judges reflect the Republican Party, then expectedly
Republican judges would display more extreme ideological voting in
affirmative action cases than in Title VII race discrimination cases,
43. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 8-9.
44. Id. at 20-21, 24.
45. Id. at 20-21.
46. Id. at 24, nn.31, 36, 48.
47. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 843 (2006) (arguing that the Repub-
lican Party opposes affirmative action).
48. Lee Reeves, Pragmatism Over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment
Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 Mo. L. REV. 481, 486 (2008) (arguing that conservatives
favor a narrow interpretation of employment discrimination laws).
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resulting in a larger gap between Republican and Democratic judges in
affirmative action cases than in Title VII race discrimination cases.
Although the partisanship rationale is a possible explanation for the
different voting gaps for affirmative action cases and Title VII race cases,
that rationale is undercut to some extent by the statistical showing that
Republican judges voted more often in favor of affirmative action plaintiffs
(47%) than they voted in favor of Title VII plaintiffs (34%).49 Assuming
the correctness of the partisanship rationale identified above, (that
Republican judges should be more ideologically opposed to affirmative
action than Title VII), one would not expect to find Republican judges
voting liberally at higher percentages in affirmative action cases compared
to Title VII race discrimination cases. However, the data in Table 2
demonstrates such a voting pattern.
The most likely explanation that the partisanship rationale is correct
despite Republican judges voting in higher percentages in a liberal
direction in affirmative action cases versus Title VII cases is that the Title
VII cases were simply weaker than the affirmative action cases. This
explanation is especially plausible given that even Democratic judges voted
for plaintiffs at much lower percentage rates in Title VII cases (43%)
compared with affirmative action cases (75%) . It is also possible that too
many attorneys accept frivolous Title VII race cases. 1 It may seem odd
that frivolous Title VII cases make it to the appellate level, but at least one
scholar has conjectured that "after slogging through the district court, the
losing party must see the additional cost and effort of appeal as
insignificant when compared to the big return of reversal. Nearly a fifth of
losing parties decide that they might as well stagger to the finish line,
seemingly regardless of their chances on appeal." 52 Alternatively, the cases
may be weaker, not because they are frivolous, but because over time the
courts have interpreted the Title VII standards in such a manner as to be
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prevail, even if the deciding judges
favor plaintiffs on Title VII issues.
49. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 20-21.
50. Id.
51. Nichole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will
Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REv. 62, 76-77 (2008) (arguing that "many
terminated employees bring discrimination claims regardless of whether there is any
indication that discrimination was the motivation behind the termination decision"); Reeves,
supra note 48, at 556 (arguing that "a considerable number of employment discrimination
claims are meritless, if not frivolous").
52. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintifs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 108 (2009).
53. Porter, supra note 51, at 76 (arguing that the burden of proof under current discrim-
ination case law is too difficult for plaintiffs); Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Dis-
crimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REv. 555, 555 (2001) (discussing how the
"courts continually impose roadblocks for employment discrimination plaintiffs that do not
exist for other civil plaintiffs").
Winter 20111 POLARIZED CIRCUITS 167
168 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL rvol. 22:1
2. Sunstein's Gender Civil Rights Cases Findings
Sunstein examined sex discrimination cases decided from 1995 through
2004. Sunstein revealed that Democratic judges voted in favor of plaintiffs
52% of the time, while Republican judges voted in favor of plaintiffs only
35% of the time.S4 A similar gap was present in sexual harassment cases,
where Democratic judges voted in favor of the plaintiff 55% of the time
and Republican judges voted in favor of the plaintiff 40% of the time.ss In
both sets of cases, the percentage gap is highly significant.56 Table 3
illustrates these judicial voting percentages.
Table 3
Democratic Judges' Republican Judges' Voting
Case Type Liberal Vote Liberal Vote Percentage
Percentage Percentage Gap
Sex
Discrimination 52% 35% 17%
SexualSeul55% 40% 15%
Harassment
B. TESTING THE RACE/GENDER GAP HYPOTHESIS USING THE SUNSTEIN
DATA
Comparing the gender civil rights case statistics in Table 3 to the racial
civil rights case statistics in Table 2, Sunstein's study does not support the
Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis that Republican judges and Democratic
judges are more closely aligned in gender civil rights cases than in racial
civil rights cases. The liberal voting percentage gap between Republican
and Democratic judges is surprisingly larger in gender cases than in race
cases, with the exception of affirmative action cases.57 The liberal voting
percentage gap between the two sets of judges for Title VII race cases is
9%, while the liberal voting percentage gap between the two sets of judges
for sex discrimination cases is 17%. The explanation for the larger liberal
voting percentage gap in sex discrimination cases is the fact that the liberal
voting percentages of Republican judges is practically the same for Title
VII race cases, 34%, as it is for sex discrimination cases, 35%, while
54. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 30.
55. Id. at 32.
56. Id. at 30, n.37.
57. The extreme gap in voting percentages for the affirmative action cases may be exp-
lained by the extreme partisanship surrounding the issue of affirmative action, as discussed
supra at II.
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Democratic judges are 9% more likely to vote for the plaintiff in a sex
discrimination case than in a Title VII racial discrimination case.s8
One explanation for the consistency of Republican judges is that
Republican judges simply hold fast to their core belief in a narrow or strict
construction of civil rights statutes, regardless of whether the subject of the
discrimination case is gender or race.59 Regardless of the reason for the
consistency, the Republican judicial consistency in conservative ideology
tends to disprove an underlying assumption of the Race/Gender Gap
Hypothesis that more extensive female Republican leadership compared
with African-American Republican leadership is predictive of greater
Republican judicial sensitivities to plaintiffs in gender civil rights cases
over plaintiffs in racial civil rights cases.
Democratic judges are 9% more likely to vote in favor of sex
discrimination plaintiffs than Title VII African-American plaintiffs, which
tends to refute that Democratic judges are equally sensitive to both types of
civil rights cases or that they are more sensitive Title VII racial civil rights
cases than sex discrimination cases. Assuming that circuit court judges
reflect the ideology of their appointing President and his party, this result is
surprising as there is evidence of a closer alignment between the
Democratic Party and African Americans than the Democratic Party and
women. 60
58. Factoring in the liberal voting percentages of Democratic judges on affirmative
action cases by averaging the liberal voting percentage of Democratic judges in affirmative
action cases (75%) with the liberal voting percentage of Democratic judges in Title VII race
cases (43%), Democratic judges are 7% more likely to vote in a liberal direction on race
cases than on sex discrimination cases, as would be expected (59%, averaging the voting on
affirmative action and Title VII race cases, versus 52% for sex discrimination cases).
However, it is questionable whether one can simply average the liberal voting percentages
for affirmative action cases with the liberal voting percentages in Title VII race cases and
use the average to predict how a judge will vote in a given race-based case, regardless of the
type of case or statute at issue. Most, if not all, of the sex discrimination cases will be Title
VII sex discrimination cases, so it is more of an "apples to apples" comparison to compare
the voting percentages for Title VII race discrimination cases and sex discrimination cases
than to factor in affirmative action cases, which are not analyzed under Title VII.
59. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. Louis L.J. 569, 591 (2003) (arguing that conservative Supreme Court
Justices fundamentally believe in a narrow interpretation of civil rights statutes).
60. Compare Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, Michelle Obama: A Contem-
porary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination Through the Lens of Title VII, 20
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 13-14 (2009) (arguing that race as opposed to gender provided
more predictive power of voter choices in the 2008 Democratic Presidential primary) and
Michael K. Brown, The Death Penalty and the Politics of Racial Resentment in the Post
Civil Rights Era, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 645, 658 (2009) (citing that African-American voters
cast an average of 87% of their ballots for Democrats over the last ten elections) with The
Gender Gap: Voting Choices in Presidential Elections, CTR. FOR AM. WOMAN & POLITICS
(Dec. 2008), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast-facts/voters/documents/GGPresVote .pdf
(demonstrating that, at most, Democratic presidential candidates have received 56% of the
women's vote since 1980).
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There are no obvious explanations for the difference in liberal voting
percentages for Democratic judges between Title VII racial civil rights
cases and sex discrimination cases. One possible explanation is that
Democratic judges have viewed gender discrimination claims as stronger
claims than racial discrimination claims. Alternatively, although these are
Democratic judges, and this Article assumes that they are ideologically
prone to be equally pro-plaintiff in both racial civil rights and sex
discrimination cases, perhaps they are willing to lower their decision
making standards for prevailing in a sex discrimination case than in a Title
VII racial civil rights case. Assuming the latter explanation is true, it is
difficult to figure out why there would be such a double standard,
particularly among Democratic judges, which this Article assumes are
more sympathetic, ideologically speaking, to both racial and gender civil
rights cases than Republican judges. Future empirical studies may shed
further light on this issue, but it will always remain difficult to determine
how circuit court judges subjectively make their decisions.
C. THE SUNSTEIN STUDY DATA ON CIVIL RIGHTS VOTING TRENDS BY
TIME PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT AND APPOINTING PRESIDENT
Before testing the Ideology Gap Hypothesis using Sunstein's data on
circuit court judicial voting patterns among more recently appointed judges
versus earlier appointed judges, it is important to examine Sunstein's two
data sets relevant to this hypothesis and what those data sets reveal. In the
first data set, Sunstein categorized circuit court judicial votes by case
category, ideology and appointing President.6 ' His findings revealed the
liberal voting percentages categorized by case type and appointing
President as illustrated in Table 4 below.
The data set in Table 4 measures whether Republican judges appointed
by earlier Republican Presidents have voted, over the periods measured, in
a more conservative manner on civil rights cases than those appointed by
more recent Republican Presidents in more recent years. Similarly, the
data measures whether Democratic judges appointed by earlier Democratic
Presidents have voted, over the time periods measured, in a less liberal
manner on civil rights cases than those appointed by more recent
Democratic Presidents in more recent years. Alternatively, the data also
demonstrates over the periods measured whether there is a narrower liberal
voting percentage gap between Republican and Democratic judges
appointed by earlier Presidents than between Republican and Democratic
judges appointed by more recent Presidents.
61. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 113-22. Sunstein also examined the percentage of
liberal judicial votes categorized by case category and individual appointing President, and
not groupings of Presidents. Id. at 114-15.
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Table 462
Case Type Kennedy/ Clinton Eisenhower/ Reagan/ Bush 11
Johnson/Carter Nixon/ Ford Bush I
Affirmative 4Afti v 75% 76% 62% 40% N/A6 1
Action
Title VII 43% 42% 38% 34% 14%
Sex
S55% 51% 42% 34% 32%
In interpreting Table 4, note that Sunstein's data does not reveal
whether all judges or each individual judge appointed by a certain President
or grouping of Presidents voted over time at a consistent liberal voting
percentage or whether those percentages changed over time. To make such
a determination would require extensive empirical research beyond the
scope of this Article. However, if the liberal voting percentages for a given
judge or group of judges did change over the course of their career, then the
data is more of a measure of whether all Democratic judges, as a group,
and all Republican judges, as a group, have moved in a particular
ideological direction over time, regardless of when or by whom each judge
or group of judges was appointed. Conversely, if all of the judges' liberal
voting percentages remained consistent over the course of their careers,
then the data is more predictive of differences in the liberal voting
percentages of more recently appointed judges versus earlier appointed
judges.
Given that the Ideology Gap Hypothesis aims to measure changes in
voting patterns between more recently appointed judges and earlier
appointed judges, this Article assumes consistent liberal voting percentages
by a given judge or group of judges throughout their careers. This
assumption allows the statistics to be used as a proxy for determining
whether more recently appointed judges of both parties are more partisan in
terms of their civil rights voting patterns than their predecessors. There is
support for such an assumption.64 Several scholars, in the context of
62. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 118-19. The statistical significance of some of
these statistics may be weak, given that the sample size of judicial votes for some appointing
Presidents is small for some categories of cases. Id. at 116.
63. Sunstein did not include data on President GeorgeW. Bush appointees and their votes
on affirmative action cases, presumably because those appointees had not yet had the
opportunity to rule on any affirmative action cases at the time of the study. See id. at 118.
64. Keith Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism
Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 483 (2001). In discussing Supreme Court Justice voting
behavior, Whittington notes:
[S]upporters of the attitudinal model have noted that Justices tend to vote in
an ideologically consistent fashion over time regardless of the particular
facts or legal issues raised in individual cases, and that simply knowing the
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Supreme Court Justices, have noted that this assumption is reasonable,
given that "Supreme Court justices [sic] serve with life tenure and are
typically appointed after serving in other political or judicial roles."65
Nonetheless, others have critiqued the assumption as tenuous and some
scholars believe that a given judge's ideological voting patterns change
66over time.
D. RESULTS OF THE SUNSTEIN DATA ON CIVIL RIGHTS VOTING TRENDS
BY TIME PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT AND APPOINTING PRESIDENT,
AND THE IDEOLOGY GAP HYPOTHESIS
Table 5, which incorporates data from Table 4, demonstrates that
Democratic judges appointed in the 1960s and 1970s have almost the same
liberal voting percentage in racial civil rights cases as Clinton-appointed
judges. Moreover, those same Democratic judges appointed in the 1960s
and 1970s have a slightly higher liberal voting percentage (4% higher) in
sex discrimination cases than their counterparts appointed by President
Clinton. This finding goes against the hypothesis that as the Democratic
Party has become more liberally partisan over time, so have Democratic
judges in terms of their votes on civil rights cases, such that Clinton
appointees would tend to vote in a liberal direction in higher percentages
than Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter appointees.
Turning to the analysis of Republican judges, Table 5 illustrates that
judges appointed by Republican Presidents in the 1950s to 1970s voted in a
much more liberal manner in affirmative action cases (62% pro-affirmative
action plan) than judges appointed by Republican Presidents in the 1980s
and 1990s (40% pro-affirmative action plan). However, Table 5 also
demonstrates that the liberal voting percentage did not drop as much when
comparing earlier appointed Republican judges' liberal voting percentages
in Title VII race cases with the percentages for Reagan and George Bush
judges (a 4% drop). Compared with Title VII race cases, there is a
past voting behavior of the Justices or even their ideological profile at the
time of their nomination is sufficient to predict accurately their votes in fu-
ture cases.
Id.; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 214-55, 363 (1993) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices vote in an ideologically
consistent fashion over time).
65. Ruger et al., supra note 6, at 365.
66. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1575-76 (2010) (finding that some Republican
appointed Supreme Court Justices voted in an increasingly liberal ideological direction in
civil liberties cases over the course of their tenure); Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 36
(finding that some Supreme Court Justices' political voting behavior became more liberal
during their tenure, while other Justices' political voting behavior became more conserva-
tive); Lori A. Ringhand, In Defense of Ideology: A Principled Approach to the Supreme
Court Confirmation Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 157 (2009) (arguing that
"the ideological direction of most [Supreme Court] Justices' jurisprudence changes (or
'drifts') over time").
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somewhat larger drop in liberal voting percentages when comparing
earlier-appointed Republican judges with Reagan and George Bush judges
and George W. Bush judges in sex discrimination cases (an 8% and 10%67
drop, respectively), but still not as much as the percentage drop for
affirmative action cases. That said, Table 5 illustrates a much more
significant liberal voting percentage drop when comparing earlier
appointed Republican judges with judges appointed by President George
W. Bush in terms of Title VII race cases (a 24% drop). 8 Assuming the
statistical significance of these percentages, these statistics support the
Ideology Gap Hypothesis insofar as they demonstrate a conservative
ideological voting shift in civil rights cases for more recently appointed
Republican judges, albeit one of varying degrees depending on which
subset of civil rights cases one examines.
Table 561
Case Type Kennedy/ Eisenhower/ Eisenhower/ Reagan/ Bush I
Johnson/Carter Nixon/Ford Nixon/Ford Liberal
Liberal Voting Liberal Voting Liberal Voting Voting
Percentage Percentage vs. Percentage vs. Percentage vs.
vs. Clinton Reagan/Bush I Bush II Bush II
Affirmative 1% 22% N/A70  N/A
Action less liberal more liberal
Title VII 1% 4% 24% 20%
more liberal more liberal more liberal more liberal
Sex 4% 8% 10% 2%
Discrim. more liberal more liberal more liberal more liberal
Looking at another aspect of the Ideology Gap Hypothesis, the
statistics in Table 4 yield mixed conclusions regarding the prediction that
the liberal voting percentage gap between earlier appointed Republican and
Democratic judges should be narrower than the gap between more recently
appointed Republican and Democratic judges, as illustrated in Table 6,
below.
For affirmative action cases, Table 6 illustrates that the liberal voting
percentage gap between Kennedy/Johnson/Carter judges and
Eisenhower/Nixon/Ford judges was 13%, while the gap was 26% between
67. The statistical significance for President George W. Bush judges voting in sex
discrimination cases may be weak given that only 37 votes were measured. SUNSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 5, at 118-19.
68. The statistical significance for President George W. Bush judges voting in Title VII
race dis-crimination cases may be weak, given that the sample included only 14 votes. Id.
69. Id.
70. There was no data for President George W. Bush judges voting in affirmative action
cases. Id.
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Clinton judges and Reagan/George Bush judges. This demonstrates a clear
increase in polarization, which supports the Ideology Gap Hypothesis.
Table 6 7
Kennedy/Johnson/ Clinton Clinton
Carter Liberal Voting Liberal Voting Liberal Voting
Case Type Percentage vs.
Es entowe Percentage vs. Percentage vs.
ixn oerd Reagan/Bush I Bush IINixon/Ford
Affirmative 713% more liberal 26% more liberal N/A72
Action
Title VII 5% more liberal 8% more liberal 28% more liberal
Sex Discrim. 13% more liberal 17% more liberal 19% more liberal
For sex discrimination cases, Table 6 illustrates that the liberal voting
percentage gap between Kennedy/Johnson/Carter judges and
Eisenhower/Nixon/Ford judges was 13%, while the gap between Clinton
and Regan/George Bush judges was 17% and the gap between Clinton and
George W. Bush judges was 19%.73 This demonstrates an increase in
polarization, but a very small one compared to the change in polarized
voting seen in the affirmative action cases.
For Title VII cases, Table 6 demonstrates that the liberal voting
percentage gap between Kennedy/Johnson/Carter judges and
Eisenhower/Nixon/Ford judges was 5%, while the gap between Clinton and
Regan/George Bush judges was 8% and the gap between Clinton and
George W. Bush judges was 28%. As with the sex discrimination cases,
this demonstrates a small increase in polarization compared to the change
in polarized voting in the affirmative action cases. Moreover, the 28% gap
between the Clinton and George W. Bush judges may not be statistically
significant due to the small sample size of judicial votes for George W.
Bush judges.74
E. ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGY GAP HYPOTHESIS IN LIGHT OF THE
SUNSTEIN DATA
To summarize the findings in Tables 4 and 5 in terms of the Ideology
Gap Hypothesis, the statistics support the hypothesis that more recently
appointed Republican judges vote in a more conservative fashion on civil
71. SUNSTEINETAL., supra note 5, at 118-19.
72. There was no data for President George W. Bush judges voting in affirmative action
cases. Id.
73. The 19% statistic may not be statistically significant, as only 37 President George W.
Bush judicial votes were measured in terms of sex discrimination cases. Id. at 118.
74. Id. at 119 (noting that only 14 President George W. Bush votes were measured).
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rights cases than their predecessors, but does not support the hypothesis
that more recently appointed Democratic judges vote in a more liberal
fashion than their predecessors. Moreover, with the exception of
affirmative action cases and the cases involving George W. Bush judges
with limited sample sizes, the Tables 4 and 6 statistics demonstrate that the
liberal voting percentage gap between earlier appointed Republican and
Democratic judges was only slightly smaller than the gap between more
recently appointed Republican and Democratic judges. Of course, with
affirmative action cases, the gap literally doubled, and the gap increased by
almost 600% in the case of Title VII cases involving George W. Bush
judges. Accordingly, the statistics in Tables 4 and 6 provide either
somewhat low-or moderate-support for the hypothesis that the liberal
voting percentage gap between more recently appointed Democratic and
Republican judges should be wider than the gap between earlier appointed
Democratic and Republican judges, depending on what weight one gives to
the statistics regarding affirmative action cases and the votes of the George
W. Bush judges.
Before discussing the implications of these findings and possible
explanations, it is worth noting that Sunstein finds that both Democratic
judges, as a group, and Republican judges, as a group, voted in an
increasingly conservative manner over time when measuring all case types
together. Sunstein finds that this increasingly conservative voting trend is
statistically significant for the entire period for Republican judges and for
the period since 1993 for Democratic judges.76 Admittedly, this finding
considers all cases, not only civil rights cases. If it reflects a similar pattern
regarding civil rights cases, however, then the finding also tends to
disprove the part of the Ideology Gap Hypothesis that more recently
appointed Democratic judges vote at a higher liberal voting percentage than
their predecessors. Moreover, this finding tends to prove the part of the
Ideology Gap Hypothesis that more recently appointed Republican judges
vote at a lower liberal voting percentage than their predecessors.
There are at least two possible explanations for why, according to
Tables 4 and 5, Clinton-appointed Democratic judges have not
demonstrated a liberal ideological shift from judges appointed by
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter, and why recently appointed
Republican judges have demonstrated a small to substantial conservative
ideological shift from Republican judges appointed in the 1950s through
1970s. First, using various empirical scales for measuring presidential
ideology, there is support for the conclusion that President Clinton was
more ideologically conservative than Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and
75. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 121.
76. Id.
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Carter. As such, and given the fact that this Article uses presidential
ideology as a proxy for judicial ideology, President Clinton would not be
expected to have appointed circuit court judges who vote in a more liberal
fashion on civil rights cases than those appointed by Kennedy, Johnson, or
Carter. Likewise, using the same empirical measurements, there is also
support for the conclusion that Presidents George W. Bush, George Bush,
and Reagan were more ideologically conservative than their Republican
predecessors. 78  Therefore, it is not surprising to find that Republican
judges appointed in the last 30 years vote in a more conservative manner in
civil rights cases than Republican judges appointed before that time.
The second possible explanation for the Table 4 and 5 findings is that
President Clinton had to navigate his judicial appointments through six
years of a Republican controlled Senate, unlike Presidents Kennedy,
Johnson and Carter, who faced Democratic Senate majorities.79
Accordingly, President Clinton may have been able to appoint only
moderate circuit court judges in order to achieve confirmation through a
Republican Senate, even though he may have desired to appoint more
ideologically liberal circuit court judges.o
On the other side of the ledger, for Republican Presidents, the history
of party control of the Senate is somewhat complex. Presidents
77. Compare Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Defending the First in the Ninth:
Judge Alex Kozinski and the Freedoms ofSpeech and Press, 23 Lov. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 259,
293 (2003) (quoting Judge Alex Kozinski as arguing that President Carter was more liberal
than President Clinton) with Michael Bailey & Kelly H. Chang, Comparing Presidents,
Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation, 17 J.L. ECON & ORG. 477,
491 (2001) (using random effects ideal point estimates to argue that President Carter was
more conservative than President Clinton and that President Clinton was more conservative
than Presidents Kennedy and Johnson) and Madeline Fleisher, Judicial Decision Making
Under the Microscope: Moving Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS L. REv.
919, 944-45, 969 (2008) (using Common Space NOMINATE Scores to demonstrate that
President Clinton was more liberal than President Johnson, but not Presidents Kennedy and
Carter).
78. Bailey & Chang, supra note 77, at 491 (using random effects ideal point estimates to
argue that President Reagan was the most conservative Republican President followed by
Presidents George Bush, Ford, Nixon, and Eisenhower); Lee Epstein et al., The Bush
Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why Conservatives Should Continue to Yearn and Liberals
Should Not Fear, 43 TULSA L. REv. 651, 652 n.10 (2008) (citing David Alistair Yalof,
Conservative Supreme Court Will Be Bush Legacy, 8 U. CONN. (2007) at 34-35, available
at http://alumnimagazine.uconn.edu/fwin2007/ feature54.html) (arguing that "George W.
Bush may have done more to transform the constitutional landscape in a conservative
direction than any President in the past century, including Ronald Reagan and Richard
Nixon"); Fleisher, supra note 77, at 944-45, 969 (using Common Space NOMINATE
Scores to demonstrate that Presidents Reagan, George Bush, and George W. Bush were
more conservative than their predecessors, but Presidents Reagan and George Bush were
more conservative than President George W. Bush).
79. Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/history/one itemandteasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2010) (outlining
the history of party control in the Senate).
80. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 113.
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Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford faced Democrat-controlled Senates for their
entire terms, with the exception of two years of a Republican-controlled
Senate for President Eisenhower.8 1 President Reagan faced a Republican-
controlled Senate for his entire two terms in office, except for the last two
years, and President George Bush faced Democratic Senate majorities
during his one-term presidency. From 2001 through 2004, President
George W. Bush navigated his judicial nominees through an almost evenly
split Senate, with control of the Senate flipping between the parties until
November 2002 when Republicans gained control.83
Unlike the Senates faced by the Democratic Presidents, there is less of
a clear trend in which political party controlled the Senate during the terms
of Republican Presidents, at least after 1987. Nonetheless, Sunstein's
grouping of the circuit court appointments of Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon
and Ford together, the appointments of Presidents Reagan and George Bush
together, and the appointments of President George W. Bush separately,
makes it not surprising to see a more conservative trend in circuit court
judicial civil rights votes for Republican judges appointed in approximately
the last twenty-five years. First, given the history of Senate party control
under Republican Presidents, predictably, Presidents Reagan and George
W. Bush should have succeeded in appointing more conservative circuit
court judges in terms of civil rights voting when compared with their
Republican predecessors. Second, by grouping President Reagan's
appointments with President George Bush's appointments, President
Reagan's appointments may have tempered any effect a Democratic Senate
majority had on President George Bush's ability to obtain confirmation of
judges who would vote in a conservative manner on civil rights cases.
There are at least three possible explanations for the findings illustrated
in Tables 4 and 6, that is, why the liberal voting percentage gap between
earlier appointed Republican and Democratic judges on civil rights cases is
only slightly narrower than the gap between more recently appointed
Republican and Democratic judges (except affirmative action cases and
cases involving George W. Bush judicial-appointee votes). First, the
increasingly conservative Supreme Court, with increasingly conservative
civil rights decisions, may be pushing lower courts in a more conservative
direction, regardless of whether the judges on those courts are Republican
or Democratic judges. 84 Second, as discussed supra, it is possible that the
nature of the underlying civil rights cases may have become weaker for
plaintiffs over time, accounting for a consistently conservative voting trend
across both Republican and Democratic judges.8 5
81. Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, supra note 79.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 113.
85. Id. at 117.
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Assuming either of these explanations is valid, the result would be the
same. There would be a relatively stagnant liberal voting percentage gap
and certainly no great widening of that gap, even if more recent Presidents
appointed increasingly partisan circuit court judges who would otherwise
tend to vote in a more partisan manner. Essentially, the gap would fail to
widen, at least not substantially, because, even if more recently appointed
Republican judges felt free to vote in a more conservative direction, more
recently appointed Democratic judges would not have felt such freedom.
Whether the results stem from increasingly conservative Supreme Court
decisions or increasingly weak plaintiffs' cases, the result observed is the
same.
The third explanation, which deserves more discussion, is that panel
effects may account for the consistent conservative direction of voting
trends across both sets of judges. 6 The theory of panel effects is that a
Republican judge sitting on a panel with two Democratic judges is more
likely to vote in a liberal direction than a Republican judge sitting with one
or two other Republican judges, and vice versa for a Democratic judge
sitting with Republican judges.87
As the executive branch changes hands between parties, the percentage
of Democratic and Republican judges also changes, as illustrated in Table 7
below.
Table 78
1980 1990 2000 2004
Percentage of
Democratic Circuit 57% 33% 43% 37%
Court Judges
Although the percentages fluctuate, a Democratic judge in 2004 was
much more likely to be sitting on a panel with one or two Republican
judges than a Democratic judge before 1980. If the theory of panel effects
is valid, then more recently appointed Democratic judges in 2004 would
have felt more constrained to vote in a conservative manner in civil rights
cases than earlier-appointed Democratic judges did in cases thirty years
ago, while more recently appointed Republican judges in 2004 would have
felt more liberated to vote in a conservative manner on such cases than
earlier appointed Republican judges did in cases thirty years ago.
In other words, the changing partisan breakdown of the federal
judiciary in favor of a higher percentage of Republican judges in more
86. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 123.
87. Id. at 7.
88. Id. at 123 (accounting for both district court and circuit court judges).
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recent years may be allowing more recently appointed Republican judges
to move toward their natural ideological extreme in voting, but precludes
more recently appointed Democratic judges from moving toward their
respective natural ideologically extremes. Hence, the liberal voting
percentage gap between the two sets of recently appointed judges cannot
widen greatly compared to that of their predecessors because only the more
recently appointed Republican judges are moving towards their ideological
extreme. Meanwhile, more recently appointed Democratic judges are
either not moving toward either extreme or may be moving in a more
conservative ideological direction, thereby casting doubt on the Ideology
Gap Hypothesis.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE EMPIRICAL STUDIES
While the Sunstein study provides some substantive responses to the
hypotheses raised in this Article, further empirical studies can provide more
complete or direct responses to the two hypotheses raised herein. This
following section outlines an ambitious suggested methodology for future
empirical studies of ideological voting in circuit court gender and racial
civil rights cases.
First, Sunstein's assignment of a liberal or conservative ideology to a
circuit court judge based on the party of the appointing President seems
oversimplified.89 A better methodology would be to measure ideology
numerically such as by assigning circuit court judges a numerical ideology
score accounting for multiple potential ideological predictors, such as
Common Space scores.90 Such a method could start with the following
ideological scores: (1) an ideology score of the appointing President; (2) an
ideology score of the home-state Senator or Senators, if one or both are of
the same party as the appointing President; (3) an ideology score for the
confirming Senate based on the numerical strength of the Republican or
Democratic majority; and (4) an ideology score based on the circuit court
judge's liberal or conservative decisions on race and gender civil rights
cases as a district judge, if the judge was promoted from a district court.
Those four ideological scores can then be combined to assign a numerical
ideology score to each circuit court judge and then grouped into ranges of
ideologies along a liberal-conservative continuum.
89. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 87-89
(2002) (arguing that assigning judicial ideology by party of the appointing President fails to
account for variations in presidential ideology within political parties, variations between
presidential ideologies and the ideologies of the judges that they appoint, and the effect of
senatorial courtesy).
90. Peresie, supra note 6, at 1772 n.52. Common Space scores are measures of ideo-
logy assigned to Presidents and Senators from 0 to 1, with 0 being most conservative and 1
being most liberal, and can be subdivided into ranges, i.e., 0 to 0.2, 0.3 to 0.5, etc.
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Having determined a method for assessing predicted judicial
ideologies, the other methodological issue is to determine what type of civil
rights cases to study. In terms of measuring voting trends and ideological
voting gaps in gender and racial civil rights cases, Sunstein's study is
arguably under-inclusive. First, future empirical studies should provide a
more accurate picture of decision making trends in gender and racial civil
rights cases over time if those studies examine circuit court judicial voting
trends over time in all cases involving any federal civil rights law
addressing race or gender and categorizing the results by case type. Within
the context of civil rights cases generally, Sunstein focused on affirmative
action, Title VII race and sex discrimination cases and desegregation
cases. 9 1
Second, future scholars may want to test for an ideological gap in
circuit court judicial voting in racial civil rights cases versus gender civil
rights cases by studying judicial voting only in cases involving federal civil
rights laws providing remedies for both race-based and gender-based
claims, and then categorizing those votes according to whether the issue in
each case was race or gender. In addition to Title VII (employment
discrimination), those federal civil rights laws would most likely include
sections 1983 and 1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code which
govern, respectively, violation of constitutional or federal rights and
discrimination by state or local actors and conspiracies to deprive
individuals of equal protection, which Sunstein did not examine. This sets
up an "apples to apples" test; for example, one is comparing circuit court
ideological voting differences between sex discrimination cases falling
under Title VII and racial discrimination cases falling under Title VII rather
than comparing circuit court voting trends in affirmative action cases with
circuit court voting trends in Title VII sex discrimination cases.
Third, while Sunstein examined ideological voting trends of circuit
court judges categorized by appointing President and the time period of the
votes, he did so for all case types and did not place civil rights cases into a
separate category. 92 For future studies, this would be an extremely telling
measurement in terms of changes, at different times in history, between the
ideological voting gap between earlier appointed judges and the gap
between more recently appointed judges, provided one examines civil
rights cases as an individual case category.
It is worth noting a few final comments and suggestions regarding
Sunstein's methodology. First, though overly simplistic, Sunstein's
measurement of a liberal vote in most civil rights cases as a vote in favor of
the plaintiff is probably the most manageable measurement.9 3
91. SUNSTEINETAL., supra note 5, at 17-18.
92. Id. at 120 (measuring circuit court voting trends by time period of votes and by
appointing President).
93. Id. at 19.
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Nonetheless, future studies may want to account for mixed votes, i.e., those
in which the judicial vote was in favor of the plaintiff on some issues and
against the plaintiff on other issues.94 Second, Sunstein's examination of
panel effects patterns, categorization of judicial votes by appointing
President and groupings of Presidents, and categorization of judicial votes
by four-year presidential terms also appear to be logical and helpful
methodological choices.95 However, for a more complete picture future
studies may want to include unpublished opinions in their data.96 Finally,
future studies may also want to introduce other variables into the study,
notably judges' age, race, and gender.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
One of the more interesting issues related to the two hypotheses raised
in this Article is what effects the current presidential administration may
have on circuit court ideological voting in gender and race civil rights
cases. There are 179 circuit court judgeships, including those in the
Federal Circuit.9 7 As of the writing of this Article, there are sixty-nine
active judges and thirty-two senior-status judges on the circuit courts
appointed by Democratic Presidents, and eighty-nine active judges and
seventy-seven senior-status judges appointed by Republican Presidents.98
Including the senior-status judges, the Republican judges outnumber the
Democratic judges by a ratio of 1.64 to 1. As of the writing of this Article,
there are also twenty vacancies on the circuit courts and thirteen circuit
court nominees pending, and, to date, President Obama has obtained Senate
confirmation of eleven nominees. 99
President Obama has the potential to make a substantial impact on the
ratio of Democratic judges to Republican judges on the circuit courts.
During President George W. Bush's two terms in office, he appointed
sixty-one circuit court judges and during President Clinton's two terms,
Clinton appointed sixty-six circuit court judges. 00 Moreover, one observer
estimates that fifty appellate judges could possibly assume senior status
during President Obama's first term, thirty-five of whom were appointed
94. Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 22, 24 n.22, 55.
95. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 26-27, 114-15, 118-20.
96. Id. at 18.
97. Federal Judgeships, UNITED STATES COURTs, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAnd
Judgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2010).
98. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsflhisj (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
99. Judges and Judgeships, Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1. http://www.uscourts.gov/
JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies.aspx. It is unclear why the number of circuit court
vacancies listed by the U.S. Courts, when added to the number of active circuit court judges
in the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, falls one short of the one hundred seventy-
nine circuit court judgeships identified by the U.S. Courts.
100. Biographical Directory ofFederal Judges, supra note 98.
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by Republican Presidents.'0o If President Obama succeeds in filling the
twenty vacancies, and if even a small portion of the anticipated
Republican-appointee senior status vacancies are filled, then by the end of
President Obama's first term, Democratic judges could occupy at least 100
circuit court judgeships.102 Moreover, one scholar estimates that during a
second Obama term, the number of Democratic judges could increase by
another fifteen.'0 3 A full two-term Obama Presidency could conceivably
result in the number of active Democratic circuit court judges almost
doubling from the number of active Democratic circuit court judges at the
start of President Obama's term, relative to the number of active
Republican circuit court judges.' 04
Although this scenario is possible, there are doubts that the past will
truly predict the future for Obama's circuit court appointments. First,
combining district court and circuit court vacancies, almost one in eight
federal judgeships remain vacant.'0o Second, nearly two years into the
Obama presidency, only 48.2% of President Obama's judicial nominees,
including district court and circuit court nominees, have been confirmed.
At that same point in the George W. Bush Presidency, 60.6% had been
confirmed, and at that same point in the Clinton Presidency, 68.4% had
been confirmed.106 Third, during President George W. Bush's first term, it
took an average of twenty-six days to confirm a circuit court nominee,
while during President Obama's first term it has taken an average of 148
days to confirm a circuit court nominee.107
Perhaps most importantly, the political makeup of the Senate seems
highly likely to change in favor of the Republicans. President Obama has
presided over a Democratic Senate majority ranging between fifty-nine and
sixty seats, with fifty-nine Senators caucusing as Democrats as of the
writing of this Article.'08  The present fifty-nine Senator Democratic
majority is just shy of a filibuster-proof majority and is the most substantial
Democratic Senate majority since 1979 to 1981.109 Despite this heavy
Democratic Senate majority, President Obama has still faced great
difficulty in achieving appointment of federal judges, as discussed above.
In light of the recent 2010 United States Senate election results, it is likely
101. Bruce Moyer, How Power Could Shift in the Federal Courts, 56 FED. LAW. 8, 8
(Sept. 2009).
102. Moyer, supra note 101, at 8.
103. Id.
104. These projections do not account for senior-status judges, for the possibility that
some judges may die in office or that some judges may resign or retire unexpectedly, and
that one or more judges may be promoted to fill Supreme Court vacancies.




108. Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, supra note 79.
109. Id.
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that President Obama's difficulties in achieving confirmation of his federal
judicial nominees will worsen in upcoming years. As of the writing of this
Article, the Democrats will hold fifty-one seats in the Senate in the 112th
Congress, with two additional independent Senators caucusing as
Democrats, a loss of six seats."o Despite the heavy loss of six Democratic
Senate seats in the 2010 election, this is not to say that President Obama
will not succeed in obtaining some appointments of ideologically liberal
circuit court judges who tend to vote in favor of civil rights plaintiffs more
than their Republican-appointed counterparts. In fact, to some extent,
President Obama's path to successful judicial confirmations seems easier
than President Clinton's path. President Clinton served during six years of
Republican Senate majorities, while President Obama will serve in office
through at least four years of Democratic Senate majorities. Accordingly,
it is hard to believe that President Obama will not succeed in confirming at
least some of his nominees in the future, thereby shifting, to some extent,
the balance between Democratic and Republican appointees in the circuit
courts. However, the shift in balance may not be as great as statistics seem
to predict.
The shift may be also be less than would be thought, given some
evidence that President Obama's political ideology may not be exactly as it
seems, at least as reflected in his judicial nominees to date. President
Obama is seen as a trailblazer in terms of race because he is the first
biracial President of the United States and he is seen as a more progressive
or liberal Democrat than President Clinton and, probably, President
Carter."' Assuming that President Obama's ideology is more progressive
or liberal than Presidents Clinton and Carter, then his appointments should
decide in a more liberal manner on civil rights issues than the appointees of
his predecessors over the past thirty-three years.1 2 That said, at least one
scholar has characterized President Obama's judicial nominees, to date, as
political moderates." 3  So far, perhaps the only perceived liberal circuit
110. A Democrat is the Winner in Washington, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2010, at A21 (noting
that Senator Patty Murray's reelection to the Senate brings the Democrats number of seats in
the Senate to fifty-three).
Ill. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Sexual Politics and Social Change, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 1523, 1533 (2009) (arguing that progressives view President Obama as a President
who can move the Democratic Party away from moderate politics and "triangulation").
112. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justifying Wartime Limits on Civil Rights and Liberties,
12 CHAP. L. REv. 675, 700 (2009) (arguing that President Obama has a liberal stance on
civil rights issues).
113. Carl W. Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REv. 769, 795
(2010) (discussing President Obama's adoption of "special initiatives to reinstitute
bipartisanship and limit politicization, especially through consultation with members of both
parties and the selection of very able, moderate [judicial] nominees").
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court nominee for President Obama is Goodwin Liu, a Ninth Circuit
nominee, whose confirmation is still lingering in the Senate.114
Even if President Obama succeeds in appointing fewer circuit court
judges or fewer ideologically liberal circuit court judges than past statistics
would seem to predict, Obama circuit court appointments could still be
highly influential on circuit court ideological voting in terms of race and
gender civil rights cases. First, any liberal shift in the ratio of Democratic
judges to Republican judges would alter the panel effects observed by
Sunstein. Currently, active and senior status Republican judges comprise
over 60% of the circuit court judiciary.'15 Therefore, assuming the validity
of the panel-effects theory, one would expect to find more Republican-
judge-heavy panels and would expect both Democratic and Republican
judges to be more likely to vote in a conservative manner on civil rights
cases. However, with President Obama appointing an increasing number
of new Democratic judges, while corresponding Republican judges leave
the bench, there will likely be more Democratically weighted panels as the
percentage of Democratic judges making up the circuit court judiciary
increases. In turn, the increasingly Democratically weighted panels and the
concept of panel effects may allow Democratic judges to perceive more
freedom to vote in a liberal fashion in civil rights cases, while Republican
judges on those same panels may feel constrained to vote less
conservatively than they otherwise would.
Focusing more on President Obama and on the liberal voting
percentage gap between circuit court judges in racial versus gender civil
rights cases, it is important to note that President Obama is a pioneer in
accomplishments by African Americans. Therefore, one may assume that
he will be more sensitive to race-based civil rights issues than gender-based
civil rights issues and that his circuit court appointments may share the
same ideology. However, three acts by President Obama during his first
year and a half in office may demonstrate otherwise. First, the first
legislative act that President Obama signed into law was the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act, which resulted from a Supreme Court decision against a
female plaintiff in a pay-discrimination claim."' 6 Second, President Obama
appointed the first Latina Supreme Court Justice, Justice Sonia Sotomayor,
which may be a testament to President Obama's devotion to both race and
gender issues.'1 7 President Obama's second Supreme Court appointment,
114. Perry Bacon, Jr., Goodwin Liu Appeals Court Nomination Advances, WASH. POST,
May 14, 2010, at The Fed Page (noting that the Senate has not yet scheduled a formal vote
on Liu's nomination and describing Liu as having "a long paper trail of liberal positions").
115. Biographical Directory ofFederal Judges, supra note 98.
116. Barak Y. Orbach, The New Regulatory ERA-An Introduction, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 559,
562 & n.18 (2009).
117. See Asmara M. Tekle, The 'Non-Maternal Wall' and Women of Color in High
Governmental Office, 35 T. MARSHAL L. REv. 169, 173 (2010) (describing Justice
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Justice Elena Kagan, a woman, might indicate a stronger devotion to
gender issues." 8 With the addition of Justice Kagan, for the first time in
history more than two female Justices sit on the Supreme Court.'19
In conclusion, the jury is still out, but President Obama's moderate
early circuit court appointments do not predict a future string of progressive
Obama circuit court nominees who will vote in a liberal direction on race
and gender civil rights cases. Moreover, some of President Obama's early
appointments and legislative achievements may indicate a surprisingly
greater commitment on his part to progressive stances on gender-based
issues than on race-based issues. Accordingly, it is very possible that
President Obama's judicial nominees will hold stronger progressive views
on gender issues than race issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
Generally, the Sunstein study is inconclusive as to both hypotheses in
this Article. For the Race/Gender Gap Hypothesis, the Sunstein statistics
do not show a wider liberal voting percentage gap between Republican and
Democratic judges in Title VII race cases over sex discrimination cases.
However, the statistics do support the hypothesis in the voting gap between
sex discrimination cases and affirmative action cases.
Regarding the Ideology Gap Hypothesis, the date is split: The Sunstein
data supports the hypothesis that more recently appointed Republican
judges vote in a more conservative fashion on civil rights cases than their
predecessors. However, the data do not support the position that more
recently appointed Democratic judges vote in a more liberal fashion than
their predecessors in those same cases. Sunstein illustrates that over time,
Republican judges have become more ideologically conservative on civil
rights issues, while Democratic judges have maintained a constant judicial
ideology or have even trended slightly more conservative. Moreover, in
comparing the liberal ideological voting gap in civil rights cases between
earlier-appointed Republican and Democratic judges with the gap between
more recently appointed Republican and Democratic judges, the Sunstein
data provides only weak support for the part of the Ideology Gap
Hypothesis that the gap has widened over time. The only exceptions where
the gap widened substantially involved affirmative action cases and cases
involving President George W. Bush's circuit court appointees.
Sunstein did not specifically test the two hypotheses of this Article or
design the Sunstein study with those two hypotheses in mind. Accordingly,
Sotomayor's nomination to the Supreme Court as groundbreaking "because she was the first
Latina in a sea of white men to be appointed").
118. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx.
119. Id.
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the study is limited in terms of its application to these two hypotheses.
Future empirical studies should specifically test the two hypotheses
outlined in this Article, should improve on Sunstein's methodology by
assigning predicted judicial ideologies in a less simplistic fashion than
Sunstein's study and should include more types of civil rights cases than
Sunstein's study. Not only may the conclusions change as a result of
changes in the methodology, but the conclusions may also change as a
result of changes brought about by circuit court appointments from 2004
through the present and Obama circuit court appointments likely to occur in
the near future.
